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Abstraci2-Cloud computing is evolved from grid computing 
with a key support from the rapidly expanding virtualization 
technology. We argue that clouding computing is particularly 
suitable for supporting emergency response and management 
(ERM) because of some of its unique features such as rapid 
setup and deployment on ad hoc basis, highly flexible 
platforms (PaaS: Platform as a Service) and application 
services (SaaS: Software as a Service) with little time-space 
constraints. ERM is one of the seven critical national 
infrastructures and services mandated to protect by the 1999 
US President's Executive Order (PCCIP). The paradigm of 
survivability and survivable network systems was a response of 
academia to the president's executive order. We concur that 
survivability should be the lifeline of any ERM, including the 
cloud computing supported (CCS) ERM systems. In this 
article, we present a research agenda that is aimed at 
developing a survivability-centered architecture for evolving 
reliable and survivable CCS-ERM systems. The research 
agenda suggests that biological and computational evolutions 
should be rich sources of biological inspirations as well as 
powerful optimization algorithm for designing (evolving) the 
ERM systems. The proposed research agenda advocates the 
application of three-layer survivability analysis, dynamic 
hybrid fault models, and extended evolutionary game theory 
modeling developed by Ma & Krings IMa & Krings (2008a-e, 
2011), Ma et al. (2009a), Ma (2008, 2009, 2010, 20lla,b). We 
use banking system survivability as an example to illustrate the 
proposed research agenda. 
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Emergency Response and 
Management, Reliability, Survivability, Three-Layer 
Survivability Analysis, Extended Evolutionary Game 
Theory, Dynamic Hybrid Fault Models, Evolutionary 
Computing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally recognized that six major paradigms of 
computing technology have been evolved since the 
invention of modem electronic computers, including: 
mainframe, PC, client-server, Internet, grid, and the latest 
cloud computing. Cloud computing is evolved from grid 
computing and has been greatly shaped by the rapidly 
expanding virtualization technology. To some extent, it is 
also a return to mainframe technology given its centralized 
management of the computing infrastructure, which is often 
hosted in remote data centers located in regions where 
energy and cooling systems are more environment friendly. 
We argue that clouding computing should be particularly 
suitable for supporting emergency response and 
management (ERM) systems thanks to some of its inherent 
technological advantages such as the extreme flexibility in 
setup, deployment and management of the computing 
resources, as well as building nearly everything (platforms, 
applications, storages) as services .  Of course, the other 
advantages of cloud computing such as "time-space limit­
free" computing, high performance and scalable storage, the 
capability to process and analyze gigantic amount of 
heterogeneous data, and the ability to integrate distributed 
and centralized computing platforms, all are very attractive 
for ERM. Nevertheless, it is the weakest link that 
determines the practical utility of a technology. In the case 
of cloud computing supported (CCS) ERM, noted as CCS­
ERM hereafter, what are the limiting factors that will 
constrain the wide adoption of CSS-ERM in practice? Can 
those limiting factors be overcome? In this article, we argue 
that reliability, security and survivability are often the key 
factors that will determine the success or failure of a CSS­
ERM system perhaps mainly because they are frequently 
ignored by the commercial service providers of cloud 
computing. This situation seems particularly obvious when 
it comes to the terms of service reliability and survivability, 
which often are dealt with the legal jargons in the service 
agreements dictated by cooperate lawyers . Of course, we 
recognize the necessity of using legal power in dealing with 
complex management issues, especially when those legal 
terms are dictated with the solid inputs from cooperate 
scientists and engineers . What we are concerned in this 
paper is that, at the present stage of cloud computing, 
insufficient attentions to the uniqueness of reliability and 
survivability of cloud computing may be preventing 
scientists, engineers, and legal experts to work out the 
service agreements that can maximally serve the interests of 
the pUblic . In other words, we believe that reliability and 
survivability should be top research agenda of cloud 
computing, especially for cloud computing aimed at 
supporting ERM. 
The security of cloud computing has received much more 
attention than its agnate peers-reliability and survivability. 
A convenient example is the public debates on the "Federal 
Cloud Computing Strategy" recently issued by the Federal 
CIO of the Obama Administration, which outlines the US 
Federal Government' s 20-billion budget migration plan to 
the cloud computing IT platform (Kundra 20 1 1 ) .  It is 
interesting to note that much of the critics and defenses by 
the federal CIO ' s  office, has been focused on the security of 
cloud computing. However, little attention seems to have 
been given to reliability or survivability. In fact, it is a 
consensus in scientific and technology communities, that 
security, reliability and survivability have their own niches 
and one cannot overtake the others, although that the niches 
are often overlapped. Given the highly asymmetric 
attentions directed to the three niches, in this paper, we 
focus on reliability and survivability of cloud computing, 
with particular references to the cloud computing developed 
for supporting ERM systems. 
Given the enormous diversity of ERM systems, it is not 
possible to present a single CCS-ERM architecture that fits 
to all ERM events. Yet, it is very helpful to study an abstract 
CSS-ERM system to capture the essential characteristics 
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and requirements . A dilemma is that an overly abstract 
CSS-ERM may become a mathematical artifact, and is not 
necessary docile for exploring the insights for dealing with 
reliability and survivability. In the present study, we adopt a 
hybrid approach, using abstract models supported with the 
example of banking system survivability. 
The extreme complexity of ERM is obvious. In the case of 
bank system, multiple complex systems are involved. First, 
we have banking system of a country or region to be 
protected, which can be conceived as the "physical system," 
the IT infrastructure (assuming cloud computing) to support 
the physical system, and a CCS-ERM system, which is most 
likely part of the IT infrastructure . The CCS-ERM system, 
in the case of bank system, may include an ERM team and 
backup system or resources to quickly setup a backup 
banking system at the team' s disposal. In addition, without a 
good understanding on the reliability and survivability of 
the banking system itself, the CCS-ERM is similar to 
protect the skin of a patient who may die from heart failure. 
Therefore, in this paper, we will also deal with the reliability 
and survivability of banking system itself, besides the CCS­
EMR designed to protect it. 
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows:  Sections 
2 and 3 present overviews on cloud computing and CCS­
ERM systems, respectively. Sections 4 & 5 discuss their 
reliability and survivability. Section 6 introduces the CCS­
ERM architecture and its implementation with banking 
system as an example. In this architecture, besides the CCS­
ERM for support banking system operation, we also include 
recent research advances on banking system survivability 
and systemic risks made in mathematical fmancing and 
ecological science. 
2. AN OVERVIEW ON CLOUD COMPUTING 
There is not a commonly accepted definition for cloud 
computing. This should not be surprising. Entering the 2 1  sl 
century, computer scientists and IT technologists have been 
vigorously searching for new and better alternatives 
computing paradigms to the client-server paradigm, which 
"destroyed" mainframe technology and pushed the 
explosive expansion of the Internet. The revolutionary 
changes the Internet technology has brought forth seem to 
have shadowed many succeeding technologies invented so 
far including grid computing, ubiquitous computing, 
pervasive computing, and grid computing. However, rapidly 
expanding cloud computing seems to be an exception that 
has achieved sufficiently conspicuous position. 
Cloud computing is evolved from grid computing. The 
technology that enables inter-grid resource sharing is the 
inter-grid gateway (lGG) and virtualization technology. 
Virtualization, i. e., building virtual machines (VM), 
provides effective provides solutions for interconnecting 
heterogeneous distributed infrastructures such as grids . 
CPU/GPU multicore technologies make VM much more 
adoptable since multicore host machine is powerful enough 
to support many VMs. The advantages of VM include 
(Costanzo et al. 2009) : server consolidation (allowing 
system administrators to combine multiple underutilized 
servers in fewer machines); running legacy code without 
interfering with new application or OS (operating systems) 
APIs; improved security by creating sandboxes for running 
application with questionable reliability; performance 
isolation (allowing service providers to offer different 
computing power to different users); running different OS 
on the same physical machine; providing flexible building 
blocks for building complex virtual networks and/or 
clusters. 
Cloud computing can mean different things to different 
people . The US NIST (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology) has revised its "Working Definition of Cloud 
Computing" no less than 1 5  times .  A key to understanding 
cloud computing from the security perspective is to 
recognize that the technology is largely not new, or untested 
(DoH-National Cyber Security Division. 20 1 0) .  Although 
this opinion may be a little bit over optimistic, it certainly 
has its 
From the user perspective, the most important concept in 
cloud computing should be "as a Service" (asS), such as 
IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a 
Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service). The services are 
more like "utilities" (e .g . ,  phone, electricity, water supplies), 
which a user can subscribe to based on his needs . From an 
ownership perspective, cloud computing may be 
distinguished as public cloud, shared cloud, private cloud, 
dedicated cloud, hybrid cloud. 
From a technological perspective, the most important 
feature of cloud computing is undoubtedly virtualization 
technology, which offer unprecedented flexibility to 
transform physical computing infrastructure resources into 
easily customable IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS. Virtualization also 
makes the centralized mainframe-style management of 
distributed computing resources much easier to implement 
than with client-server paradigm. From user' s perspective, 
the power and advantages of client-sever computing, even 
the convenience of PC are fully preserved with cloud 
computing. In addition, with the ever increasing adoptions 
of cloud computing, the underlying infrastructures of the 
future Internet will unavoidably be submerged in cloud. 
Given that cloud computing seems most directly evolved 
from grid computing, we can say that cloud computing takes 
the advantages of all previous five major computing 
paradigms from mainframe, PC, client-server, the Internet, 
grid computing. 
3. AN OVERVIEW ON CLOUD COMPUTING 
SUPPORTED EMERGENCE RESPONSE AND 
MANAGEMENT (CCS-ERM) 
It is probably more difficult to defme emergency response 
and management (ERM) than to defme cloud computing 
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due to the extreme diversity of emergency events. 
Emergency events such as earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, 
snowstorms, and cyber attacks can be natural or artificial, 
gradual, sudden, or cyclical (seasonal), and often lead to 
crisis or disaster (Kelly 20 1 0) .  Each year, it is estimated that 
200 million people are affected and 1 50,000 people died due 
to various crisis and disasters . ERM, often the relief 
response effort, is not only an important functional service 
of government, but also part of humanity performed by 
various organizations and individual citizens. Four stages 
are generally recognized in ERM: preparedness, response, 
recovery, and mitigation (Kelly 20 1 0) .  
Of course, we humans have been dealing with emergency 
events from ancient times and from our births. The skills of 
ERM must have accompanied the evolution of human 
beings. Competition, cooperation and communication are 
three fundamental interactions that underlie evolution and 
many natural and engineered processes (Ma 20 1 0) .  It is 
obvious that cooperation is the very spirit (humanity) and 
fundamental force of ERM, and communication plays a 
critical role in ERM. It is also obvious that the computing 
technology has greatly boosted our ERM capabilities, and 
play indispensable role in modern ERM activities. 
The applications of computing technology to ERM, 
especially the Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) and 
wireless sensor networks (WSN) have been extensive in 
recent years (e.g. ,  Ma & Krings 2008f, 2009). However, the 
advances of cloud computing in support of ERM have been 
slow. The National Science Foundation of China (NSFC) 
has launched a key research program titled "Emergency 
Response and Management of Unexpected Catastrophic 
Events." ( www.nsfc.gov.cnlnsfc/cenlxmzn/20 llxmzn/03/06.html) 
with a six year budget of 80-million Chinese dollars since 
2008. One major project in this research program is set for 
cloud computing supported ERM. The Idaho National Lab 
(INL) of the US Department of Energy in the US is building 
an emergency operating center (EOC) supported by cloud 
computing, but the platform will not be deployed until 20 12  
(EMI-SIG 20 1 1 ) .  In  Europe, where In  Europe, where 
privacy laws are more circumspect than in the US), cloud 
computing is not as popular as in the US (DoH-Cyber 
Security Division 20 1 0) .  Instead, Europeans seem more 
interested in adopting online software and service delivery 
with secure hosted environments . UK government is 
probably an exception in Europe, but UK is more sanguine 
about private cloud. In Japan, cloud computing is promoted 
as industry strategy, rather than government IT strategy. 
Interestingly, Singapore government, US National Science 
Foundation, and the University of Illinois (UIVC), and a 
few US companies (HP, Intel, Yahoo) have been 
collaborating on a project termed Open Cirrus TM, which is 
developing techniques and software infrastructure to support 
cloud computing. The Open Cirrus is intended to build The 
Open Cirrus a testbed that consists of a collection of 
federated data centers for open-source systems and services 
research. Currently, there are six sites that host data centers 
for the Open Cirrus testbed. It should be noted that except 
for the fIrst two projects, i .e . ,  the NSFC CSS-ERM project 
and the US DoE INL EOC, the other cloud computing 
projects mentioned above are not designed specifIcally for 
ERM (DoH-CSD 20 l O) .  
INL defIned EOC (Emergency operating center) as a central 
command and control facility that is responsible for 
performing the principles of emergency management 
functions at a strategic level in an emergency situation. As 
part of the federal government' s  migration to cloud 
computing efforts : INL set fIve tasks to upgrade to cloud 
computing paradigm. Those are : centralized information 
management, world-class image and reputation, facilities 
and technology for future, fluid communication and 
collaboration, and workforce mobility. The so-termed cloud 
delivery model of INL EOC consists of three categories 
entities :  emergency (crisis) information, applications, and 
live video. The crisis information includes :  emergency 
notifIcation, signifIcant events, mission/tasks, plume 
models, facility maps, critical data, position logs, and aerial 
photos .  The applications include RASC, INL-VIZ, ALOHA, 
Hysplit, EPI Code, Google Earth, IWTS, etc . For example, 
INL-VIZ is virtual reality software developed by the Center 
for Advanced Energy Studies (CAED) and the Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL). The immersive virtual reality 
system consists of a high-end computer and a 3D TV as 
well as some optical tracking systems for interaction. The 
EOC depends on live video, but for some emergency events 
(such as collapse of bank system), live video may be of little 
use. 
4. RELIABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF 
CLOUD COMPUTING 
Like any computing platforms humans have invented, cloud 
computing is not perfect. For example, US Federal CIO 
(Chief Information OffIcer) has formally issued Federal 
Cloud Computing Strategy in the February of 20 1 1  with a 
budget of 20 billions, but the critics have raised serious 
security concerns with the migration plan. Although security 
may not always be a top concern in ERM, reliability and 
survivability of cloud computing for supporting ERM must 
always be addressed adequately to support the missions of 
ERM such as saving lives and protecting the critical national 
infrastructures (e . ,  banking systems of a country) . Currently, 
the unique issues associated with the reliability and 
survivability of cloud computing may have not received 
suffIcient attention, and the attention in the context of ERM 
is essentially missing. 
According to US NIST, cloud computing is largely not new 
or untested. When it comes to reliability and survivability, 
we interpret this view as follows: much of the cloud 
computing is evolved from previous generations of 
computing technologies, and there are no revolutionary 
technological breakthroughs involved in the implementation 
of cloud computing. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
there is no new technological issues that must be addressed 
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in cloud computing. In contrary, there are indeed some new 
issues regarding the security, reliability and survivability of 
cloud computing, especially due to the wide adoption of 
virtualization technology. For example, while virtualization 
is crucially positive for dealing with the heterogeneity in 
cloud computing, but its influences on security, reliability 
and survivability seem to be double edged sword. For 
example, while virtual machine (VM) technology can boost 
system reliability by using multiple VMs distributed over 
multiple heterogeneous host servers to form a cluster of 
VMs, and therefore should boost the reliability. 
Nevertheless, an isolated host server may become the single 
point of failure for all the VMs it hosts . The net influence of 
virtualization will depend on the tradeoff of virtualization 
brought into cloud computing. 
In the above Figure 1 ,  one host machine running Mac OS 
hosts several virtual machines running various OS such as 
Windows 7, Ubuntu, Windows XP, Fedora, Solaris .  If the 
host machine crashes or becomes unstable, then all the VMs 
running on the host may lose the ground to survive .  The 
host machine may become a single point of failure. On the 
other hand, those VMs can be confIgured as isolated, and 
therefore, the failure of one machine will not affect the 
reliability or security of other virtual machines .  




__ In ... 
0. __ _ 
Fig. 1. Virtualization: A host (running Mac OS) hosts several 
guest virtual machines (VMs) by running open source software 
Sun VirtualBox (Source: http://www.virtualbox.org). 
In most cases, the single point of failure can be overcome by 
careful design. For example, by using two identical VM 
systems (i. e . ,  two host machines with exactly the same guest 
VM confIgurations) and mirroring corresponding guest 
machines, the reliability of the whole system should be 
greatly improved, and the risk of single-point-of-failure 
becomes much less serious. Intuitively, VM technology 
increases the system complexity and therefore may 
increases the vulnerability to software bugs; this is not 
necessarily the case.  For example, if the host system runs a 
more stable OS such as UNIX, the reliability of guest 
machine running a less stable OS on the host may actually 
be improved in comparison with running the guest OS 
directly on the same hardware . 
The survivability of cloud computing should be improved if 
it is designed and built with full consideration of 
survivability requirements. This is because virtualization 
technology can be harnessed to improve the survivability, 
especially the resilience or the capability to return to restore 
critical functionalities after a catastrophic failure. For 
instance, restoring a VM is a much simple operation than 
restoring a traditional physical machine because the former 
can be as simple as a "copy" command. In addition, the 
capability to boost reliability in general also improves the 
survivability, especially the resistance aspect of the 
survivability . 
Therefore, the reliability and survivability of cloud 
computing depend on the proper design and implementation 
that fully consider the requirements of reliability and 
survivability. Although existing reliability and survivability 
theories and technologies are largely sufficient in meeting 
the requirements of reliability and survivability of cloud 
computing, the reliability and survivability of cloud 
computing are not automatically guaranteed without 
leveraging the advantages (such as the high flexibility in 
setup and restore of VMs, and the mirroring of VM across 
multiple host systems) of virtualization technologies to 
balance the potential disadvantages (such as single-point-of­
failure) of virtualization. In other words, the key to achieve 
high reliability and survivability of cloud computing lies in 
proper design and implementation. If the requirements for 
supporting reliability and survivability are ignored in the 
design and implementation of cloud computing services, 
virtualization can easily become a source of troubles and 
lead to disaster. This situation is not much different from the 
current debates on the security of cloud computing in the 
context of Federal Cloud Computing Strategy. On the one 
side, the critics of the strategy deems that security 
challenges the current cloud computing faces makes the 
technology premature for the federal IT services .  On the 
other hand, the advocates of the strategy believe that 
security is not a unique new issue to cloud computing and 
can be fully addressed with existing knowledge and 
technologies .  We believes that the reliability and 
survivability of cloud computing can also be adequately 
addressed with the existing theories and technologies. What 
we are somewhat concerned is that insufficient attentions 
have been paid to the requirements of reliability and 
survivability in current design and implementation of cloud 
computing services .  
5. RELIABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF 
CLOUD COMPUTING SUPPORTED ERM 
It is clear that modern ERM systems consists of at least the 
following four dimensions or subsystems : (i) cloud 
computing services or computer networks prior to cloud 
computing becomes the dominant IT computing platform; 
(ii) ERM system; (iii) the physical system (e.g. ,  banking 
system, a cohort of people trapped by a natural disaster) to 
be protected, restored or rescued by means of ERM system; 
(iv) ERM personnel including commanding team or the 
decision-maker. A problem with this dissection or 
classification of the ERM system is that it is hardly possible 
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to identify the boundaries of the four subsystems .  In other 
words, they are more like four side dimensions (faces) of a 
cube, and missing of one dimension may break the structure . 
Furthermore, the computer network or cloud computing 
services (in the case of our proposal), which is responsible 
for ensuring the proper interactions and communications 
among the four dimensions, is increasingly playing a critical 
role . Indeed, computer networks have become part of the 
ERM systems, and the network decision-maker interactions 
increasingly becomes the central nerve system or brain of an 
ERM system. 
Emergency response an management 
system for protecting physical entities. 
Cloud computing services or other 
com uter networks. 
ERM Personnel (Commanding Center). 
Figure 2. C loud Computing Supported Emergency Response 
and Management (CCS- E R M) System: CSS often supports 
both E R M  and the physical systems directl y. 
Although the point seems to have rarely been explicitly 
made in existing literature, we recognize that the paradigm 
of survivability and survivable network systems (SNS) can 
serve as an architecture of the above described cloud 
computing (or computer network) supported ERM systems. 
In fact, survivability and SNS were initially developed to 
serve as driving theory and technology for protecting critical 
national infrastructures, one of the seven national critical 
infrastructures specified in the US President' s 1 999 
Executive Orders, is emergency services.  The following is 
an extremely brief summary on the background of 
survivability and survivable network systems. 
The concept of survivability originated from the study of 
military survivability and nuclear deterrence strategy in the 
1 960s, but the currently prevalent survivability analysis 
(science) and survivable network systems (engineering) 
rapidly emerged in the last decade are near a total new 
scientific theory and engineering discipline, except that they 
preserve a core idea of survivability. The core idea is that 
survivable system must survive catastrophic events 
(especially those caused by human initiated malicious acts) 
by either preserving critical functionalities (resistance) or 
quickly recover from the loss of critical functionalities 
(resilience). The technology and social background for the 
paradigms to emerge was that starting in 1 990s, computer 
networks increas ingly control the nation' s  critical 
infrastructures, whose incapacity or destruction would have 
a debilitating impact on defense or economic security. It 
was initiated as a research initiative to implement an 
Executive Order of the US President George Bush on the 
protection of critical national infrastructures in 1 999, which 
specified 7 categories of critical infrastructures, including 
telecommunications, electrical power grids, gas and oil 
storage and transportation, water supply, emergency 
services, banking and [mance, and continuity of government 
services.  Especially, after 9 . l 1  (200 1 )  and Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans (2005), the essence of survivability 
and survivable network systems (SNS) under various guise 
of terms (such as information assurance, cyber security, etc) 
entered the national security policy agenda pushed by 
multiple government agencies including US National 
Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, 
National Science Foundation, Department of Energy' s  
National Labs. Since 1 999, multiple U S  Presidents ' 
executive orders, related to this agenda, have been issued. 
During their development processes, research on 
survivability have penetrated into and also draw from other 
relevant fields in computer science and engineering, most 
notably, security, reliability, dependability, and safety. 
Essentially, survivability is the civilian version of 
information warfare or defensive information warfare . 
Nevertheless, there have been few significant advances in 
quantitative research on survivability due to its necessity in 
dealing with potentially drastic uncertainties such as human 
malicious acts . 
In a dissertation titled "Reliability and survivability analyses 
with survival analysis, dynamic hybrid fault models, and 
extended evolutionary game theory," Ma (2008) introduced 
a few new concepts, mathematical methods, and the 
strategies for designing and managing survivable network 
systems, including UUUR (uncertain, latent, unobserved, 
and unobservable risks), Byzantine generals 'playing' 
evolutionary game, dynamic hybrid fault models, three­
layer survivability, and extended evolutionary game theory 
(Ma & Krings 2008a-d, 2009a,b, 20 1 0a,b, 20 1 1 a,b) . In the 
last few years, the work has been extended into a general 
modeling and simulation architecture that can be applied to 
the study of complex engineering, biological (ecological), 
and social systems, where the risk analysis and management 
are a core issue . Several important applications, including 
prognostics and health management (PHM) of aerospace 
systems, reliability and survivability of distributed 
networks, etiology of human microbiome associated 
diseases and frailty analysis for personalized medicine, 
strategic information warfare, and survivability in cloud 
computing, have been attempted or conceived. 
We argue that the above discussed survivability and SNS 
paradigms are generally applicable for capturing the 
functionalities and missions of the CCS-ERM illustrated 
with Figure 2, especially the physical system entities (e.g. , 
infrastructures) and cloud computing services (or computer 
networks). In fact, the combined system of infrastructure 
and computer network is the very "system" the original 
survivable network system paradigm refers to . 
The two other components in Figure 2, ERM is often 
closely integrated with (or part of) both the infrastructure 
and computing networks that support the infrastructure. The 
cloud computing often supports both ERM and the 
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infrastructures directly. The ERM personnel are often the 
commanding center or decision-makers . 
Since much of existing survivability research has been 
focused on the survivability of the computer networks 
(cloud computing services in the case of this article), and 
also the survivability of ERM and ERM personnel systems 
are more about human factors in management, the key 
research agenda in the CCS-ERM systems depicted in 
Figure 2 is then the survivability of the infrastructure . 
Nevertheless, due to the extreme diverse nature of 
infrastructure, it is very difficult to develop a general 
architecture and/or approach for analyzing the survivability 
of various kinds of infrastructures, and the analysis should 
be done on case-by-case basis . In the following section, we 
present an example of the survivability analysis of banking 
systems. 
6. THE RESEARCH AGENDA WITH 
BANKING SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE 
As stated previously, we consider that the reliability and 
survivability of a CSS-ERM system depend on the 
reliability and survivability of its components, especially 
those of the physical system (infrastructure) and the network 
system that supports the whole system and missions, which 
in our case is the cloud computing. In fact, the critical 
infrastructure and the network system are so closely 
integrated that the survivability and survivable network 
system (SNS) have been advanced to study the protection of 
the infrastructure . The problem of ERM is essentially the 
same as the problem of critical infrastructure protection, and 
indeed, ERM is one of the seven critical national 
infrastructures designated by the US President's 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) . 
If we wish to emphasize the difference between EMR and 
other critical infrastructures, it is the somewhat two ad-hoc 
components : the ERM and management system and the 
EMR personnel .  Obviously, the two other components : 
physical system and network exist implicitly in the ERM 
systems. Of course, the system reliability/survivability is not 
the simple addition of the reliabilities of its components at 
all; the interdependencies among the components are 
equally important with, if not more than, the influences of 
its components. In the simplest case, if the four components 
can be considered as a series system of independent 
components, then the reliability of the whole system is equal 
to the product of the reliabilities of its components . In 
reality, the independency assumption is hardly realistic, and 
the relationship should be much more complex. The 
survivability will be even more complex due to the 
additional uncertainties, vulnerabilities, and frailty. 
Therefore, traditional reliability and survivability analysis 
approaches usually can provide very limited helps to the 
study of critical infrastructure protection, including ERM 
systems. Instead, more recent advances such as dynamic 
hybrid fault models (DHF), survival analysis, extended 
evolutionary game theory (EEGT), three-layer survivability 
analysis, resilience, and tipping point theory may provide 
more useful approaches to the reliability and survivability of 
critical infrastructures including ERM systems. As we have 
argued repeatedly, ERM is essentially a survivability 
problem. In the following, we use banking system as an 
example to propose a research agenda (architecture) for 
evolving (design and management in traditional sense) of a 
survivable banking system. 
6.1. Community of Banks vs. Community of Biological 
Species. 
We humans live in communities, and so do the biological 
species .  A work defmition of biological (or ecological) 
community is the assemble of biological species, which can 
be plants, animals, microbes, virus, bacteria phages, 
plasmids, etc . In our living communities, we all belong to 
Homo sapiens, but strictly, we identify ourselves as races, 
ethnic groups, different countries, families, sexes .  The first 
shared property between biological community and the 
community we humans form is that both are assembles of 
somewhat heterogeneous entities and those entities interact 
with each other. A second shared property between 
biological community and living community is that both 
communities are dynamic in both time and space. A third 
shared property is that both communities are influenced by 
environment. It should be emphasized that, although the 
focal entity of community ecology is community, the study 
of environment is equally important for understanding 
community dynamics .  
Community ecology is one of the oldest and also the most 
important branches of ecology. It studies the spatial and 
temporal dynamics as well as their relationships with 
environment. Although community dynamics should be 
approached from both the structure and function 
perspectives, few existing studies have adopt such a joint 
strategy. The majority studies on community dynamics were 
conducted from the structure perspective. The minority of 
studies from functional perspective in macro ecology have 
been conducted in the context of ecosystem energetics or 
food web. Accordingly much of the theory for community 
dynamics has been developed from the structure 
perspective. Since community structure or composition is 
often measured with community diversity (or complexity), 
and therefore, the study of community dynamics is often 
centered on the analysis of community diversity 
(complexity) in time and space. Some of the most 
commonly studied properties of community dynamics 
include : diversity (evenness and richness) and its dynamic 
changes, diversity-stability-disturbance paradigm, from 
which some of the most prominent ecological theories in 
community ecology were developed, including species­
area-time (SAT) curves and island biogeography theory, 
species abundance distribution (SAD), neutral theory, 
diversity-stability paradigm, intennediate disturbance 
hypothesis (IDH), etc . 
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Community can also be modeled as a network of species, or 
species interaction networks. One of the most extensively 
studied species interaction networks is food web, in which 
the species in the community are linked by feeding 
relationships .  Other species interaction networks, or 
ecological networks, include mutualistic networks, 
parasitoid-host networks. In these ecological networks, 
nodes are species, and links are various species relationships 
(interactions such as predation, mutualism, parasitism, etc). 
In 2006, US National Academy of Science and Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter NASFRB) initiated a 
joint project titled "New directions for understanding 
systemic risks" and participated by some 1 00 experts from 
22 countries. The initiative was motivated by the realization 
that, there was little understanding on the systemic risk of 
the banking system as a whole (or bank networks) given that 
individual banks vigorously pursue various strategies for 
maximizing profits and minimizing risks. The project was 
targeted to draw inspiration from engineering, ecology and 
some other selected fields of science, and the subsequent 
events further steered the research to seek ideas for potential 
regulatory refonns that can minimize systemic risk but still 
allow appropriate degree of risk-taking by individual banks. 
It is remarkable that eminent ecologist Lord Robert May led 
the project, and furthennore, ecological principles and 
models played a core role in analyzing the systemic risks of 
current banking systems and deriving recommendation to 
policy-makers (National Research Council of the National 
Academies .  2007). In section 6.2, we present a very brief 
summary on the recent advances in the ecological approach 
to banking system performed by May and his colleagues, 
but in the remainder of this subsection, we first present a 
conceptual introduction on the analogy of banking system as 
an ecological community. We do not necessarily follow the 
conventions and concepts in May et ai' s  studies (May et al. 
2008, May & Arinaminpathy 20 1 0, Haldane & May 20 1 1 , 
Beale et al. 20 1 1 ), but the idea should be consistent. Of 
course, the errors in our presentation are our own. 
By analogy, banks in fmancial system can be considered as 
forming a community. Figure 3 is a diagram that abstracts 
banking system as a counterpart of biological community. In 
this illustrative diagram, we see the ' environment' of the 
banking system, consisting of government regulations, 
economies, various types of warfare (military, financial, & 
infonnation), natural disasters, etc . Any of the environment 
factors may influence the dynamic structure, functionalities 
and of the banking system. The central rectangular box 
represents the banking system from a structure perspective; 
the community of banks is composed of various types (the 
counterparts of biological species in a biological 
community) such as central banks, retailer, investment, 
private, etc . The five small boxes in the center capture the 
major interactions and processes that are going on in a 
typical banking system. These interactions (processes) 
include : splitting and collapsing (e.g. , bankruptcy) (similar 
to natural death or extinction in biological community), 
merge and acquisition (predation in biological community), 
commensalism, competitIOn and mutualism (e.g. ,  ally 
between banks). In community ecology, commensalism 
refers to species relationship, in which one species benefit 
from the association, and another species is neither 
benefited, nor disadvantaged. This relationship is not unlike 
the relationship between investment bank and retailer bank. 
The box below the five process boxes indicates the 
fundamental problems of "bank community ecology", i. e . ,  
structure, function, and dynamics of banking system. The 
two boxes in the bottom remind us the difference between 
the risk of an individual bank and systemic risk of the 
banking system as a whole. Furthermore, individual banks 
may have different frailties, which further complicate the 
estimation of systemic risk. This is one of the main 
problems May and his colleagues have addressed in a recent 
series of papers (May et al. 2008, May & Arinaminpathy 
20 10 ,  Haldane & May 20 1 1 , Beale et al. 20 1 1 ) .  Similar 
problems also exist in personalized medicine, where frailty 
analysis offers a powerful approach to studying the 
relationship between individual and population risks (Ma et 
al. 20 1 1b).  
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Figure 3. Banking System as a Community, Ecosystem, or Network of Species 
6.2. Ecology of Banking System-Systemic risks, 
Resilience and Survivability 
As reviewed in Haldane & May (20 1 1 ), pursuing of the 
balances in both natural ecosystem and what can be called 
financial ecosystem started in parallel in 1 960s 
approximately. By the 1 970s, pioneering ecologists such as 
Robert May who published a seminal monograph on the 
model ecosystem stability (May 1 973), have realized that, 
contrary to then commonly-held belief that complex 
ecosystem is more stable, instead, complexity can be a 
destabilizing force in breaking the balance. For example, in 
a randomly assembled community of N interacting species, 
the community can experience a sharp phase transition from 
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overall stability to instability when the number and strength 
of interactions among species grow, and the transition can 
predicted by a simple mathematical relation: ma2 > I, 
where m is the average number of links per species, and a is 
the average strength of the links. May ' s  ( 1 973) theoretic 
work with model ecosystem spawned an avalanche of 
studies on the complexity-stability problem both 
theoretically and experimentally since 1 970s, which have 
been expanding with the latest direction pointed to the 
approaches from "new science of networks" initiated by 
Erdos & Renyi' s ( 1 960) random graph theory and 
rejuvenated by Watts & Strogatz ( 1 998), Barabasi & Albert 
( 1 999) seminal papers. In recent years, lots of further 
advances on ecological networks have been achieved and 
extensive literatures in this field, including some excellent 
reviews (e .g . ,  Dunne 2005, Ings et al. 2009) have been 
published. More recently, the state-of-the-art research on 
community dynamics seems to have been shifted to two 
critically important issues :  (i) the validity of the assumption 
of community equilibriums; (ii) the roles of cooperation and 
communications in community dynamics .  Firstly, most 
existing ecological theories, including community dynamics 
theory, either implicitly or explicitly contain the assumption 
of equilibrium. This status is not only due to our tendency to 
believe that nature should be in balance or equilibrium 
states, but also due to our limited ability in analyzing non­
equilibrium systems in science. Secondly, the current food 
web network centered community analysis largely ignores 
the roles of cooperation and communication (behavior) in 
community dynamics .  
In the study of stability (dynamics) of ecological 
communities (networks), the current challenge is not the 
recognition of the missing aspects; rather it is how to 
incorporate them into existing theoretical frameworks. In 
contrast, in the study of the balance of financial ecosystem, 
or stability of fmancial networks, studies similar to those 
performed in ecology in the last few decades were not 
present until May and his colleagues '  recent works (May & 
Arinaminpathy 20 1 0, Haldane & May 20 1 1 ,  Beale et al. 
20 1 1 ) .  It is in the wake of the global financial crisis started 
in 2007 that led to the recognition that we have little 
knowledge on the apparent cascading failures in banking 
system. 
Haldane & May (20 1 1 )  also clearly identified the major 
differences between fmancial and ecological systems. The 
fust difference is that today ' s  ecosystems are the products of 
millions of years ' evolutionary selection, and the 
evolutionary history of current financial system is only a 
couple of hundred years . The regulatory hands of 
governments, which are often passionate due to the concern 
of "too big to fail," certainly have deep influences on the 
evolution and establishment of current fmancial systems. It 
is therefore often the case that the fattest, rather than the 
fittest, survive in banking industry. 
May & Arinaminpathy (20 1 0) abstracted an individual bank 
in a banking system as a node with four basic activities 
(monetary flows): deposits (d), interbank borrowing (b), 
external assets (e), and interbank loans (I). The fust two 
flows are liabilities of the bank, and the last two flows are 
the assets (Figure 4). To stay in the business (maintaining 
solvency), the bank ' s  net worth must be positive, i. e. , 
Yi =(e,+li)-(di+b,):?O. 
The individual banks are connected as a network via IE 
activities .  Most studies on bank networks prior to May & 
Arinaminpathy (20 1 0) were performed with simulation 
analysis and on the assumption of Erdos-Renyi random 
network. May & Arinaminpathy (20 1 0) noticed that the 
9 
topology of US Fedwire system is highly non-random, with 
a few big banks connected to many small banks. 
Furthermore, they used analytic approach (mean field 
approximations for the networks) to study the non-random 
network, which help to deepen and generalize some 
insights . Their study sets an exceptional example that 
theoretical ecology, just like theoretical physics, can find 
broad applications beyond biology. It should be natural for 
other ecological models such as community niche model, 
evolutionary game theory models to fmd similar 
applications in the study of financial ecosystems. 
By studying the interbank network model system with the 
principles and models from ecology, May & Arinaminpathy 
(20 1 0) tackled the big question: how banking system failure 
such as displayed in 2008 global financial crisis could 
occur. The principles, models, and methods May & 
Arinaminpathy adopted in their study are familiar to 
ecologists . In fact, the mathematics employed by May and 
his colleagues is simpler than many mathematical models in 
fmancial engineering or mathematical finance that is used to 
engineer the complex fmancial derivatives .  The latter often 
requires very sophisticated mathematics such as measure­
theoretic probability theory, functional analysis, and partial 
differential equations . Yet, the results and conclusions May 
and his colleagues draw not only offer deep insights into the 
problems inherent in prevailing methods of pricing complex 
derivatives, or arbitrage pricing theory (APT), but also 
demonstrate the beauty and elegance of theoretical 
(mathematical) ecology. 
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Figure 4. An abstract bank node in the interbank network 
(Adapted from May & Arinaminpathy 2010). 
Much of May and his colleagues research was focused on 
the analysis of APT (May et al. 2008, May & 
Arinaminpathy 20 1 0, Haldane & May 20 1 1 ,  Beale et a1. 
20 1 1 ) .  They credited the first recognition of the inherent 
problems with APT to Warrant Buffet, who stated 
"derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction" in 
his company ' s  2002 annual report (Buffet 2002). May and 
Arinaminpathy (20 1 0) research provided mathematical 
support to Buffet' s claim. Their studies also support 
Caccioli et aI ' s  (20 1 0) conclusion that APT is part of the 
problem, since APT is not a 'theory' in the traditional sense 
of sciences. Instead, APT is a set of idealized assumptions 
upon which much of the mathematical fmance or fmancial 
engineering is built upon (Haldane & May 20 1 1 ) .  The 
tragedy is that those idealized assumptions may be out of 
touch with reality. When they are introduced into real world 
fmancial systems, the assumptions become self-fulfilling 
theory. Even if the theory is mathematically correct, the 
practical implications in real world can be a totally different 
matter. 
6.3. Three-Layer Survivability Analysis and its 
Application to Banking System Survivability 
The so-termed three-layer survivability analysis (Ma 2008) 
is a general quantitative approach (architecture) that can be 
applied to model and analyze the survivability of physical 
systems (e.g. ,  critical infrastructures) or information system 
(e .g . ,  wireless sensor networks or cloud computing 
services). In this general architecture, reliability and 
survivability have a unified definition and a set of modeling 
approaches .  The three layers refer to tactical, strategic, and 
operation levels. 
At the tactical level, reliability is largely equivalent to 
survivability when the influences of UUUR (uncertainty, 
latent, unobserved, and unobservable risks) events can be 
ignored or postponed the next levels-strategic and 
operational levels. The mathematical tool at the tactical 
level is usually survival analysis, reliability theory, or other 
similar methods such as the first passage problem and 
random walks. The individual (component) properties are 
often addressed at the tactical level. 
At the strategic level, the focus is often systemic risks, or 
the reliability and survivability of the whole system are 
studied. Due to the existence of redundancy, which includes 
spatial and/or temporal redundancy and is necessary for 
achieving reliability and survivability, a key mathematical 
tool is the dynamic hybrid fault models (DHF) (Ma 2008, 
Ma & Krings 2008e) and the extended evolutionary game 
theory modeling (EEGT) (Ma 2008, Ma 2009, Ma & Krings 
20 1 0) .  DHF converted traditional static (or discrete) and 
qualitative hybrid fault models into time-dependent and 
survival (reliability) based probabilistic models . 
Furthermore, DHF introduces the so-termed "Byzantine 
Generals Playing Evolutionary Game" to deal with the 
dynamic nature of reliability and survivability. This notion 
refers to the extension of classic Agreement algorithms from 
distributed computing with survival analysis and 
evolutionary game theory modeling. When agreement 
algorithms are not limited to the Agreement algorithms 
(developed from Byzantine Generals problem) in distributed 
computing, this integration of survival analysis (from 
strategic level), agreement algorithms, and evolutionary 
game theory becomes more general extended evolutionary 
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game theory (EEGT). EEGT then should be applicable to 
any problems to which traditional evolutionary game theory 
(EGT) is applicable since EEGT simply makes EGT more 
realistic in describing the dynamic behaviors of game 
players. 
At the operation level, the execution of the tactics and 
strategies obtained from the analyses conducted at the 
previous two layers is the key. In other words, this is a level 
that manages survivable network systems. The principle of 
hedging is adopted to deal with the impact of UUUR events. 
There are two critical concepts and corresponding models, 
which are supported by complex mathematical and 
computational models developed at tactical and strategic 
levels, i. e . ,  expected survivability (ES) and threshold 
survivability (TS). It is through the coordinated 
management efforts based on the values of ES & TS, that 
the system survivability is maintained. 
To apply the three-layer survivability analysis, we must first 
identify the system to be analyzed. In the case of banking 
system survivability (and ERM), the system (Figure 2) 
consists of two main sub-systems: the cloud computing 
service and the banking system itself, since the other two 
systems (personnel and ERM) are usually integrated into the 
two main systems. For example, the ERM personnel are 
most likely the same personnel who support a bank ' s  IT 
team (who should manage their cloud computing team). For 
each of the two main systems, we can apply the three-layer 
survivability analysis, but the analysis and management of 
the two systems must be integrated as an organic whole, 
which is best approached at the operational level (Figure 5) .  
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Fig 5 .  Three-Layer Survivability Analysis of Cloud 
Computing Supported Banking System. 
In the above Figure 5 ,  we can see two interconnected three­
layer survivable systems : banking system and cloud 
computing service that supports the mission of the banking 
system. We also see that both systems share a common 
operational level, which is necessary because there must be 
a centralized management and commanding system in place 
that executes the tactics, strategies, and policies dictated by 
the common mission of the organization (which can be a 
financial company or a country' s  banking system). The 
necessity of this shared level is also obvious from 
management perspective. In fact, we omit the whole 
management system from CEO to CTO, from COB 
(Chairman of the Board), to government regulatory 
agencies. Ideally, the interface with the latter bodies should 
occur at the operational level, although some of them should 
defmitely be involved in the analysis and design of the two 
lower layers . At the bottom of the diagram are the necessary 
and reliable facilities supports such as physical security, 
HR, and logistics .  
It  should be noted that the requirements to separate both 
banking system and cloud computing service in the middle 
of the above diagram (Fig. 5) are two-fold. The first is that 
both systems, i. e . ,  the infrastructure and cloud computing 
(essentially IT support system) are of different nature and 
culture . Second, cloud computing may be an outsourced 
service to large IT enterprises such as IBMTM or even 
Amazon™ who owns one of the currently most popular 
cloud computing services (i. e . ,  EC2-Elastic Compute 
Cloud. http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/fags/) . 
6.4. Evolving a Survivable Banking System 
From above review and discussions, we can see the 
enormous complexities involved in the system design and 
management, not to mention the possible missing gaps. 
Some of the gaps have been intentionally omitted in this 
article to avoid overwhelmingly complex details, and others 
may have slipped our sights. For example, we have never 
explicitly discussed near ubiquitous nonlinear interactions in 
both ecological and financial systems. Yet, it is a fact and 
reality theoretically (mathematically) and practically that 
nonlinearity is often the mother source of all the bizarre 
dynamical behaviors we have observed in both nature and in 
fmancial world. Since the 1 960s, enormous advances have 
been made under the general umbrella of complexity 
science, as well as in various disciplines of natural and 
social sciences and engineering. New concepts and research 
fields such as catastrophe theory, butterfly effect, chaos 
theory, phase transitions, small world network, power law & 
scale-free networks, resilience & tipping point theory, have 
become part of science and technology jargons. Yet, there 
are two phenomena that seem to have changed little : one is 
that the inherent unpredictability of complex systems 
continues to "disappoint" us, but the emergent orders 
(patterns) displayed by complex system keep teasing our 
curiosities and hopes for better understanding, designing 
and management of complex systems. Recent advances 
suggest that traditional design and management approaches 
seem to offer little help . Researchers and practitioners 
increasingly look into, more favorably than ever, the 
algorithm of evolution, from both perspectives of Darwin ' s  
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biological evolution and computational evolution to solve 
real world hard problems. Evolution by natural selection is 
essentially a computing algorithm: any system that 
possesses replication, variation, and competition has the 
potential to evolve by adapting in response to the relevant 
external variables affecting the system (Banzhaf et al. 2006, 
Foster 20 1 0) .  Besides competition, cooperation and 
communication should also play equally important roles in 
the evolution of biological or non-biological systems. The 
study of cooperation, especially when formulated as 
prisoner' s dilemma (PD) game, has generated extensive 
interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary ramifications .  
Today, there is hardly a scientific field that has not been 
touched by the study of cooperation. In contrast, the study 
of communication has been a relatively recent advance. For 
example, the handicap principle that is now considered to 
govern the honesty of animal communication was only 
accepted widely in the later 1 990s (Zahavi 1 997). Yet, the 
critical importance of communication is obvious because it 
can modulate the competition and cooperation. In the 
analogy of banking system with biological community, 
(Figure 3),  we can see all three forces :  competition, 
cooperation and communication are in effect. The adoptions 
of evolutionary game theory (EGT) and extended EGT in 
our previously discussions should further facilitate the 
evolutionary approach to the problems we are interested in 
this article . 
7. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
7.1. Scoping the CCS-ERM System: what have not 
been covered in previous sections 
We propose a survivability and evolution centered research 
agenda for cloud computing supported ERM system. In the 
following, we summarize the main contents of the proposed 
research agenda, but first, we need to scope the research 
problem more precisely by further elaborating on the 
following three issues .  
People: ERM is ultimately a management problem, which is 
both science and art. Significant portion of the ERM 
involves people, for example, ERM personnel or people to 
be protected from the jeopardy of catastrophe. Often, the art 
part of the activities involving people is best managed by 
law, policies, and/or regulations for law abided citizens. In 
other words, the critical important of relevant law, 
regulations, and policies are recognized in the proposed 
CSS-ERM systems, but it is not the focus of this article 
since this article is more about research agenda and 
architecture . What laws and regulations can accomplish for 
an ERM system should be written in implementation and 
management manuals .  On the other hand, for human 
initiated malicious actions (intrusions/attacks), which can be 
illegal, survivability is designed to deal with the malicious 
nature of those activities .  Although we do not deal with 
legal sanctions against illegal activities, the so-termed 
UUUR concepts in survivability paradigm can be utilized to 
capture the influences and consequences of malicious 
actions .  The malicious actions are dealt with at the more 
technical level because while law can penalize people for 
their behaviors, but it is often beyond the capability of law 
to remedy for the consequences of the malicious actions, 
especially in the case of ERM due to extremely high 
sensitivity of timing. 
Diversity of ERM Systems: The second issue in defining 
and ERM systems is the extremely high diversity of ERM 
systems. Different ERM systems can have very different 
missions, personnel, structure, functionalities, logistics, 
urgency time framework, spatial scope, chain reactions, 
long term effects, the relationship with environment etc . 
Therefore, it is unrealistic to develop a general CCS ERM or 
any ERM that is applicable to various kinds of emergency 
events or catastrophes. Nevertheless, it is important to 
recognize that there are certain general characteristics 
underlying many, if not all, ERM systems. It is those special 
characteristics, and principles and methodologies which are 
particularly suitable for studying them, that prompt us to 
develop the research agenda outlined in this article. 
Security: Is security important for survivability or ERM? 
Indeed, it is frequently of critical importance. However, 
similar to the diversity of emergency events, security 
(whether physical, information, or network security) is 
extremely diverse. It is beyond the reach to consider 
detailed technological aspects of the security in a research 
agenda such as we propose. In fact, it is not necessary to get 
into the details of security in our research agenda. Indeed, 
when the paradigm of survivability and survivable network 
system (SNS) were initiated in the late 1 990s, security has 
already been recognized as top headache of IT technologies 
and the security industry has already emerged to 
increasingly take shares from the fellow sectors of IT 
industry. Yet, it was already clear that security alone is not 
adequate for assuming the mission required for protecting 
critical national infrastructure. It is often the case that 
security itself requires the support of reliable and survivable 
environment. For example, without reliable hardware and 
software, security can only be a beautiful blueprint on paper. 
Without the safeguard of survivable strategies and tactics in 
place, security may be wiped out by a simple physical 
security violation or the betrayal of a disgruntled network 
administrator. Of course, some of these issues have been 
dealt within the framework of security policy; nevertheless, 
the security policy is designed in the context of security 
needs of an organization. The problem is that the security 
needs often ignore some of the critical requirements 
identified by the survivability paradigm, such as some of the 
UUUR risks, and fault-tolerance design (e .g . ,  Byzantine 
generals playing evolutionary games). In contrast, the 
paradigm of survivability and SNS have been developed to 
include some instruments (concepts, principles and 
methods) to incorporate security aspects necessary for 
fulfilling the missions of protecting critical national 
infrastructure or emergency response and management. 
7.2. Executive Summary of the Research Agenda 
1 2  
The goal of the research agenda we propose i s  to  develop an 
architecture for cloud computing supported (CCS) 
emergency response and management (ERM) system (CCS­
ERM). The architecture, when applied to a CSS-ERM for a 
specific type of emergency event such as banking system, 
can be utilized to build (evolve) a survivability-centered 
ERM system. Compared with existing architectures and 
ERM systems, our research agenda, when implemented 
possesses the following unique features :  
( 1 )  Survivability i s  the lifeline of the CCS-ERM system our 
research agenda advocates and implement. The CCS-ERM 
system we propose to build is a survivable network system 
(SNS) that consists of at least two interconnected 
subsystems : the physical system (infrastructure, e .g . ,  
banking system) and the cloud computing service that 
supports the protection of critical infrastructure or the 
mission of an ERM system (Figure 2). Depending on the 
kinds of ERM, there may be other regular or ad-hoc systems 
(components), for example, ad hoc ERM personnel (rescue 
teams) in case of natural disasters . 
The internal structure of the SNS for CSS-ERM is both 
hierarchical and compartmental (Figure 5) .  The 
compartmental structure refers to the relative separation 
between the infrastructure and cloud computing service, but 
both compartments are interconnected with the bidirectional 
flow of information, and feedbacks. The hierarchical 
structure refers to the three-layer survivability models for 
each of the two interconnected parallel compartments. 
Those three layers are : tactical, strategic, and operation 
levels. Each of the three layers functionally supports the 
layer(s) on top of the current layer, and three peer-pairs are 
formed. The structure is similar to ISO 7-layer open 
communication standard reference model or the TCP-IP 
architecture of the Internet. Information flow is another 
common feature of shared by CCS-ERM and the ISO open 
communication model. 
In one word, survivability is the lifeline and architecture of 
CCS-ERM system (Ma & Krings 2008a-d, 20 1 1 , Ma 2008, 
2009, Ma 20 1 0) .  
(2) Both the Evolution by natural selection (Darwin' s  
biological evolution theory) and evolution by artificial 
selection (computational evolution) are optuTIlzation 
algorithms (Banzhaf et al. 2006, Foster 20 1 0, Ma 20 1 1 a) .  In 
nature, the extant species is evolved by natural selection and 
it is the fittest that survives. We not only take the inspiration 
from evolution for building CCS-ERM, but actually evolve 
(compute with computational evolution) the system. The 
example of the former case includes using ants colony 
relocation as a strategy for the transfer of besieged refuges 
in a natural disaster such as hurricane Katrina. The example 
of the latter includes the using of ants colony optimization 
(A CO) algorithm, which is a general-purpose computational 
algorithm, . e.g. ,  to find the optimal cloud computing service 
configuration. 
In one word, evolution is the algorithm to compute the 
implementation of the survivability-centered CCS-ERM 
architecture (Foster 20 lO ,  Ma 20 1 1 a) 
(3) Biological (ecological) inspirations can be rich sources 
of ideas for designing survivable CSS-ERM systems. For 
example, the analogy between ecological community 
(ecosystem) and banking system (Figures 3 & 4), prompt 
May and his colleagues to re-think the "survival of the 
fattest" and "too big to fail" management notions in banking 
industry. By conducting ecological modeling and network 
analysis of banking system, May and his colleagues (May et 
al. 2008, May & Arinaminpathy 20 l O, Haldane & May 
20 1 1 ,  Beale et al. 20 1 1 ) demonstrated, by modeling and 
simulation analyses, the possible bank failure mechanisms 
occurred in 2008 global financial crisis . Of course, not every 
ERM system may have a biological counterpart. Yet, it 
should be worthwhile to search for possible inspiration in 
the first place. 
In general, bio-robustness and ecological stability should be 
rich sources of survivability (Ma & Krings 2008d, 2009). 
(4) Three-layer survivability analysis, which consists of a 
set of mathematical and computational methodologies (Ma 
2008, Ma et al . 2009a, Ma & Krings 20 1 1 ), can be 
harnessed to analyze the requirements of CCS-ERM system 
and further "design" (compute by evolution algorithms) 
CCS-ERM systems. As mentioned previously, the three­
layer survivability analysis can be applied to both CCS and 
the infrastructure (physical system) . 
At the tactical level, standard reliability analysis and 
survival analysis (Ma 2008, Ma & Krings 2008a-c, 20 1 1 ), 
as well as other relevant mathematical approaches such as 
the first passage time (FPT) (Ma et al. 2009b), random 
walks can be utilized to analyze the reliability of the CCS­
ERM components (such as bank nodes). An advantage of 
survival analysis is its inherent capability in dealing with 
censored information, which can be utilized to assess the 
consequences of UUUR events. 
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GLOSSARY 
AA (AG R E E M ENT ALGOR ITHMS) 
APT (Arbitrary Pricing Theory) 
B EACO N (Bio-computational Evolution in ACtiO N)  
CCS E R M  (Cloud Computing Supported E R M) 
CTO (Chief Technology Officer) 
D H F  (Dynamic H ybrid Fault Models) 
EGT (Evolutionary Game Theory) 
E EGT (Extended Evolutionary Game Theory) 
EOC (Emergency Operation Center) 
E R M  (Emergency Response and Management) 
ESS (Evolutionary Stable Strategies) 
FPT (First Passage Time) 
I D H  ( I ntermediate Disturbance H ypothesis) 
I N L  ( Idaho National Laboratory) 
N AS (US National Academy of Sciences) 
N AS F R B  (NAS & Federate Reserve Bank) 
N S FC (national Natural Science Foundation of China) 
PaaS : (P latform as a Service) 
SaaS : (Software as a Service) 
P D  (Prisoner's Dilemma) 
SAD (Species Abundance Distribution) 
SAT (Species Area Time curve) 
S N S  (Survivable Network Systems) 
U U U R  ( U ncerta i n ,  l ate nt, Unobserved and  U nobse rva b le  R isks)  
VM (Virtual Machines) 
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